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ABSTRACT
We analyze the impact of China's growth on the exports of other Asian countries. Our innovation
is to distinguish the increase in China's demand for imports from its increased penetration of export
markets. Using the gravity model, we disaggregate among commodity types and account for the
endogeneity of Chinese exports. We confirm the tendency for China's exports to crowd out the
exports of other Asian countries. But this effect is felt mainly in markets for consumer goods and
hence by less-developed Asian countries, not in markets for capital goods or by the more advanced
Asian economies for which machinery and equipment are a significant fraction of exports. At the
same time, there has been a strong tendency for a rapidly growing China to suck in imports from its
Asian neighbors. But this effect is mainly felt in markets for capital goods, where China's income
elasticity of import demand is highest, and thus by the more advanced Asian economies. Hence,
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1.  Introduction 
  China’s integration into the world economy is one of the most important 
developments affecting the structure and evolution of the global system at the dawn of 
the 21
st century.  Over the last 20 years, China has grown at a rate of nearly 10 per cent 
per annum, driven primarily by the expansion of the modern, industrial, export-oriented 
sector.  With some 20 million Chinese workers moving from rural underemployment to 
the modern sector annually, the impact is akin to adding another middle-sized industrial 
economy to the world economy each year.  And with between 200 million and 300 
million workers still to be reallocated from rural underemployment, this is not simply a 
one-time shock but an ongoing process that should continue for a decade and more.
2 
China is now the sixth largest economy in the world when its output is measured 
at market exchange rates; at purchasing power parities it is of course larger still.
3  It is the 
world’s fourth largest trader.  Reflecting its growth strategy, its exports have grown even 
faster than its economy, at rates in excess of 20 per cent per annum.  As a result China’s 
share of world trade has risen from less than 1 per cent two decades ago to 6 per cent 
                                                 
1 University of California at Berkeley, Sookmyung University, and Bank of England, respectively.   An 
earlier draft of this paper was presented at the KIEP/Claremont conference on East Asian regionalism, 
Seoul, 26-27 August 2004.  We thank Charles Adams and Andrew Rose for helpful comments. This paper 
represents the views of the authors and should not be thought to represent those of the Bank of England. 
2 Of course, there are some who warn of the existence of serious challenges, such as the condition of the 
banking system and the state enterprises, that may interrupt the growth process, as well as constraints like 
relatively low levels of human capital that may pose even more persistent problems.  We do not address 
these questions in the present paper. 
3 Insofar as the focus of this discussion is China’s impact on other economies and the latter is felt primarily 
through channels like trade, market rather than purchasing power parity exchange rates are the appropriate 
basis for comparison (a point made by IMF 2004).   2 
today.  Its market share in Japan (that is, the share of Japanese imports originating in 
China) more than tripled between 1990 and 2002, rising from 5.1 per cent to 18.3 per 
cent.  The same is true of its market share in the United States, which rose from 3.2 per 
cent in 1990 to 11.1 per cent in 2002.  The same is again true, albeit starting from a lower 
base, of the European Union, where the comparable figures are 2.0 and 7.5 per cent.
4   
The structure of China’s exports has been changing as well, away from the 
clothing, footwear, other light manufactures and fuels that dominated its trade in the 
1980s and early 1990s, toward office machinery, telecommunications, furniture and 
industrial supplies in the late 1990s and automated data processing equipment and 
consumer electronics in recent years.  Along with the growth of Chinese exports has 
come the rapid growth of Chinese imports.  What was once a chronic trade surplus has 
recently become a deficit, reflecting China’s growing demand for primary commodities 
(such as crude oil and copper), intermediate inputs (components for electronic products 
and other consumer durable goods), and capital goods (in consequence of the economy’s 
high investment rate).    
The effects of these trends are likely to be felt especially intensely by China’s 
Asian neighbors.  Geographical proximity, shared borders, linguistic commonalities, and 
the existence of extensive networks of overseas Chinese are among the reasons to expect 
large amounts of trade between China and the rest of Asia.  In some cases, similarities in 
stages of economic development, factor abundance, technological capability, and 
production costs mean that other Asian economies will compete head to head with China 
in third markets.  Thus, China’s emergence may intensify the competitive pressure felt by 
other Asian economies, slow the growth of their exports, and challenge the sustainability 
                                                 
4 These figures are adjusted for intra-EU trade.   3 
of high growth more generally.  In other cases, different stages of economic development, 
technological capability and comparative advantage may mean that China’s exports and 
other Asian countries’ exports are complements rather than substitutes.  To the extent that 
China’s exports are still dominated by consumer goods, the country does not compete 
directly in third markets with advanced Asian economies like Japan and South Korea that 
export machinery and equipment.  In addition, China’s modern, export-oriented 
manufacturing sector relies on imported raw materials, energy, components, and capital 
equipment.  Thus, the faster the country’s exports grow, the faster will grow its imports 
of materials, components and equipment, thereby stimulating rather than slowing the 
export growth of its neighbors.  At some level it is obvious that all of these factors are at 
work, to a different extent in different countries.  The most that can be said at this level of 
abstraction is that the impact of China’s export growth on the exports of other Asian 
economies is unclear. 
How China’s emergence is affecting the export competitiveness of the country’s 
neighbors has important implications at the national, regional and global levels.  Most 
obviously, the impact of China’s exports has implications for national development 
trajectories, in Asia and elsewhere.  If the addition each year of another medium sized 
emerging market to the global economy drives down the world market prices of labor-
intensive manufactures, this will heighten the incentive for other countries to move up the 
technological ladder into the production of more technologically-intensive, less labor-
intensive exports in order to better insulate themselves from Chinese competition.  In 
order to do so, they will presumably want to invest even more in human capital.  In   4 
contrast, countries that produce raw materials and capital goods utilized intensively in 
Chinese manufacturing may wish to specialize further in these areas.   
At the regional level, China’s emergence suggests that any regional free trade 
arrangement or effort to more closely coordinate monetary and financial policies will not 
be attractive if it does not involve what will eventually be the region’s largest economy.  
This fact already finds reflection in policy, for example in the Chiang Mai initiative to 
provide swap lines and credits for financially-embattled economies, which is a project of 
ASEAN+3 (ASEAN plus China, Japan, and South Korea). 
Globally, the impact of China’s exports on the exports of other Asian countries 
has implications for whether we should expect a revaluation of the yuan to lead to a 
general revaluation of Asian currencies and to thereby help to redress the problem of 
global imbalances.  One frequently heard argument is that if China revalues, moderating 
the competitive pressure felt by other Asian economies, those other Asian economies will 
be able to revalue as well, and the general realignment of Asian currencies against the 
U.S. dollar will help to narrow the U.S. current account deficit and relieve the 
competitive pressure felt by Europe without causing major disruptions to the world 
economy.  But if China’s exports are positively correlated with the exports of its Asian 
neighbors, insofar as the main impact of China’s export growth is to stimulate that 
country’s own demand for imports of raw materials, components, and capital equipment 
from elsewhere in the region, then a revaluation of the RMB which slows the growth of 
China’s own exports may work to reduce the exports of the neighbors, depressing rather 
than boosting their own growth and creating pressure for depreciation rather than 
appreciation elsewhere in the region.  Thus, the general revaluation of Asian currencies   5 
seen by some observers as a solution to the problem of global imbalances may not in fact 
follow from a slowing of Chinese growth due to a tightening of domestic credit or from a 
yuan revaluation.  
These are the questions motivating the analysis in this paper of the impact of 
China’s exports on the exports of its Asian neighbors.  In contrast to most previous 
efforts to address this issue, we estimate the impacts in question using econometric 
methods, rather than deriving them from a simulation model where the results flow from 
the assumptions implicit in the calibration of key parameters.  We distinguish the impact 
of China’s growth on its own imports from other Asian countries, on the one hand, from 
its impact on the exports of other Asian countries to third markets, on the other.  We 
distinguish the impact of China’s growth on other Asian countries’ exports of capital 
goods, intermediates, and consumption goods.  And we distinguish the impact of Chinese 
competition in industrial- and developing-country markets. 
Our results are striking.  We find that the crowding out of other Asian countries’ 
exports to third markets resulting from the growth of China’s exports is limited to 
consumer goods, at least at this stage.  In contrast, the increase in other Asian countries’ 
exports to China is most elastic in the case of capital goods.  This implies that the effect 
of Chinese growth is negative for low-income Asian countries that export mainly 
consumer goods and feel the brunt of Chinese competition in third markets, but positive 
for high-income Asian countries that export mainly capital goods and benefit from 
China’s voracious appetite for imported machinery and equipment. 
 
   6 
2.  Previous Studies 
  There have been a few previous analyses of these questions.  The study with the 
strongest similarities to our own is Ahearne, Fernald, Loungani and Schindler (2003).  
The authors use a panel of annual data spanning the period 1981-2001 for four NIEs 
(Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) and four (additional) ASEAN members 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand), considering the impact of China’s 
exports on the exports of these neighboring countries.  They regress the growth of these 
countries’ exports on the growth of foreign incomes and the change in the country’s real 
exchange rate, and then add China’s real export growth as an additional regressor to these 
export equations.
5  While the coefficient on Chinese exports tends to be positive, 
suggesting complementarities between its exports and those of its Asian neighbors, the 
effect in question rarely approaches statistical significance at standard confidence levels.  
On this basis the authors conclude that there is “little evidence that increases in China’s 
exports reduce the exports of other emerging Asian economies.  Indeed, it appears that 
China’s exports and exports of the other countries are positively correlated.”
6 
  The question has also been addressed in the context of China’s WTO accession.  
China’s accession to the WTO is modeled as a liberalization of its trade regime that 
increases its propensity to import and export.  Thus, Ianchovichina and Walmsley (2001) 
calibrate and simulate a multi-country, multi-sector model of international trade, and find 
that China’s WTO access, while increasing the country’s own exports, reduces the 
exports of Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia and Malaysia (due mainly to 
the negative impact on their textile and apparel sales).  They find that WTO accession  
                                                 
5 Country fixed effects are also included in the regressions, as are a lagged dependent variable and lagged 
independent variables in some cases. 
6 Ahearne et al. (2003), p.21.   7 
has a positive impact on the exports of Japan and the NIEs (Hong Kong, South Korea, 
Singapore and Taiwan), due mainly to the increase in their exports to China of high 
quality textile and electronics inputs (along with miscellaneous exports of processing 
industries).  As they summarize their results, “Japan and the newly industrialized 
economies in East Asia will also benefit from China’s accession to the WTO...As 
important suppliers of materials to China, these countries will observe an improvement in 
their terms of trade and returns to capital.”  In both Japan and the NIEs, the projected 
increases in production are driven mainly by expansion in exports to China.  On the other 
hand, their simulations suggest a decline in exports (mainly of textiles and apparel) and a 
reduction in GDP relative to baseline levels in East Asia’s developing countries.   
Similarly, Yang and Vines (2000) simulate a multi-sector, multi-country model 
with differentiated products as a way of analyzing the impact of China’s growth on 
exports from other Asian countries, finding that the exports of the ASEAN countries drop 
slightly while those of Japan and the NIEs both rise.  These overall effects are the sum of 
positive effects on exports to China itself and negative effects on exports to third markets, 
which differ in size depending on the Asian exporter concerned.   
Yet another simulation is that of IMF (2004), which uses a computable general 
equilibrium model designed to capture the geographical and sectoral structure of trade 
flows.  This analysis points to a small negative impact on the exports and output of all 
regions.  In terms of output, this negative effect (measured as the percentage deviation 
from the values obtaining in the slow-Chinese-growth baseline) is largest for the Middle 
East and North Africa and smallest for the advanced economies.  The ASEAN economies 
experience a somewhat larger than average impact, while the NIEs and South Asian   8 
economies show a somewhat smaller than average impact.  The precise effects vary by 
sector and country.  For example, countries that rely heavily on exports of textiles and 
clothing, labor-intensive manufactures in which China also has a comparative advantage 
tend to experience particularly large negative effects.   
  The limitations of the literature will now be apparent.  The results of simulation 
studies are dependent on how the models in question are calibrated, which tends to beg 
the question at hand.  Econometric studies have not yielded precise estimates of the key 
effects, leading investigators either to draw inferences from coefficients that are not 
significantly different from zero or to suggest on the basis of their failure to identify a 
significant effect that one does not exist.  This gives us more than enough motivation to 
reconsider the question. 
 
3.  Data and Methodology 
          Our data on trade flows are from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics.  They 
provide us with bilateral merchandise trade between 180 IMF trading entities through 
2002.
 7  CIF imports are recorded in millions of U.S. dollars.  We deflate imports by the 
U.S. CPI for all urban consumers.
8  Real GDP and GDP per capita (in constant 1995 U.S. 
dollars) are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Other 
country-specific variables, such as land area and language, are from Rose (2002).
9 
  The framework for our analysis is the familiar workhorse of the empirical 
international trade literature, the gravity model.  We consider bilateral flows between the 
                                                 
7 Below we also use the United Nations trade data base, whose country coverage is somewhat more limited 
(149  versus 180  countries) but which permits us to disaggregate capital goods, intermediates and 
consumer goods. 
8 1982-1984=100; from http://www.bls.gov/data/home.htm. 
9 The distance measure, on which we comment further below, is from Rose’s website as well.   9 
13 Asian exporting countries and all 180 importing countries.
10  Using a matrix of 
bilateral trade flows, we regress the log imports of country i from country j (say, of 
Denmark from South Korea) on the log GDPs of the two countries, the log per capita 
GDPs of the two countries, the distance between them, and the other now-standard 
gravity model arguments (combined land area, land lockedness, number of islands, 
common language, common colonizer, whether the countries in question were ever in a 
colonial relationship).  Our innovation is to include a measure of China’s exports to the 
same market (in the case of the present example, Denmark).  In addition, we model 
separately China’s imports from other Asian economies using this same framework.
11  
  It is important to recognize the potential endogeneity of China’s exports.  
Unobserved factors (for example, an improvement in consumer sentiment worldwide) 
that increase South Korea’s exports to Denmark will also in general increase China’s 
exports to Denmark, creating a correlation between the error term and the key 
explanatory variable.  The standard treatment for this type of problem is instrumental 
variables, the difficulty being the paucity of plausible instruments that is the bane of 
empirical macroeconomics.   
Fortunately, in the present context the gravity model suggests instruments that are 
both plausibly exogenous and strongly correlated with Chinese exports.  The obvious 
                                                 
10 With provision for observations dropped due to missing variables.  When no trade is recorded between a 
pair of countries, it is not clear how to treat this observation.  Conventional practice in the gravity model 
literature (followed here) has been to simply drop these observations.  An argument can be made that this is 
a source of truncation bias.  Fortunately, studies like Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) that have used Tobit 
and similar methods to adjust for the possibility of truncation tend to find that the impact on the estimated 
coefficients is minimal. 
11 Unfortunately, it is not possible to include country-pair fixed effects, which authors like Anderson and 
Marcouiller (2002) suggest might be quite important in practice, since we are already using a country-pair 
specific variable, namely distance.  Below we follow Anderson and Marcouiller’s suggestion for how to 
address this problem, namely to add country-specific institutional variables.     10 
instrument, in other words, is the distance between China and the country that is the 
destination of its exports.   
In addition, the gravity model suggests including China’s GDP as an instrument 
in the first-stage equation.  While this variable, like distance, is strongly correlated with 
China’s exports, questions can be raised about its exogeneity.  But the dependent variable 
in the first stage regression is China’s exports to a particular market, Denmark for 
example, not its aggregate exports.  While there are compelling reasons for thinking that 
China’s model of export-led growth involves causality running from export growth to 
GDP in addition to the other way around, it is less plausible that China’s aggregate GDP 
is significantly affected by its exports to Denmark.  In practice, the results for the 
equations we discuss are essentially the same when we limit the instrument set to 
distance, although the coefficient estimates are slightly less precise. 
 
4.  Basic Regression Results 
We start with the equations for the impact of China’s exports on the exports of 
other Asian countries.  These cover the period 1990-2002.
12  Recall that we include here 
observations for all bilateral trade flows between Asian countries and their trading 
partners (South Korea’s exports to the United States, South Korea’s exports to Denmark, 
etc.), excluding of course the observations for China’s exports and imports, which are 
treated separately in Section 9 below.   
                                                 
12 While we also have data for earlier years, prior to 1990 China was significantly less integrated into the 
world economy, making it unlikely that the information content of these earlier data will shed useful light 
on current concerns.  Below we discuss how the results change when we limit the analysis to an even 
shorter period.   11 
Panel a of Table 1 shows the results of estimating the model with the constraint 
that the basic gravity-model coefficients are the same for all importing and exporting 
countries.  The bottom of the table (panel b) shows the results of the first stage regression 
for China’s exports, which is useful for gauging goodness of fit and will come in handy 
for counterfactual simulations.  Note that standard econometric methodology dictates 
including in the first stage not just China’s GDP and the distance from China to the third 
market but also the other exogenous variables from the second stage. 
The gravity model fits the data well.  Exports rise with the GDP and GDP per 
capita of the importing and exporting countries.  They fall with distance and with the 
combined land mass of the trade partners (geographically large countries tending to do 
more internal trade and less international trade, other things equal).  Land-locked 
countries and countries spread across multiple islands trade less, while countries 
presently or previously in a colonial relationship, that share a common border, and that 
share a common language trade more.  All of these effects except for common land 
border are significantly different from zero at the 95 per cent confidence level. 
The variable of particular interest, the fitted value or exogenous component of 
Chinese exports to the same market, enters with a negative coefficient of -0.18 and a t 
statistic of 7.38 (column 1 of panel a) when the full set of instruments is used.  This tells 
us that, other things equal, a 10 per cent increase in Chinese exports to a particular market 
results in a 1.8 per cent decline in the sales of the competing Asian country in that 
market.  The effect differs significantly from zero at standard confidence levels.   12 
Column 2 shows what happens when we drop China’s GDP from the instrument 
set.
13   The coefficient on China’s exports is still negative (-0.22), although somewhat 
less precisely estimated (with a t statistic of 6.94).  It is also interesting to contrast the 
instrumental-variables results in columns 1 and 2 with the OLS results in column 3.  
Clearly, using distance from China as an instrument makes an important difference.  In 
column 3 (which we include only for comparison’s sake), the coefficient on China’s 
exports is positive. 
 
5.  Sensitivity Tests 
One reason to worry about the robustness of these results is structural change, a 
phrase that is frequently uttered in the same breath as China.  Given rapid changes in the 
composition and direction of Chinese exports, the third country effects could be different 
in earlier and later years.  Our first set of sensitivity analyses, in Table 2, therefore 
replicates the preceding analyses for the second half of the sample period (1997-2002).  
The change in results is plausible.  The crowding out effect is now larger (0.33 instead of 
0.18).  Still, these changes are still not large enough to overturn our other results.
14   
An additional reason for caution is that our main instrumental variable, the 
distance from China to third-country export markets, is not time varying.  In effect, we 
are trying to answer a time series question (how China’s growth is affecting the exports 
of its neighbors) mainly by exploiting the cross-section variation in the data.  The 
appropriate treatment for this problem is to add time-varying instruments.  For example, 
                                                 
13 While we are skeptical, for reasons explained above, that Chinese exports to an individual national 
market (as distinct from total Chinese exports) have a first-order impact on Chinese GDP, the results using 
the more limited set of instruments are nonetheless useful for gauging the robustness of our findings. 
14 Specifically, the results of our simulation exercises in Section 9 below are not significantly different 
when we base our calculations on these alternative coefficients for the second half of the sample period.   13 
Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) suggest that institutional variables such as corruption 
and imperfect contract enforcement have a significant impact on the propensity to trade 
and should be included in gravity model estimates.  Intuitively, these variables capture 
the tendency for insecurity and country risk to act as a hidden tax on trade.  While 
measures of them display persistence, they are far from constant over time.  In our 
context, the implication is that changes in China’s country risk (as a proxy for the ease 
and reliability of trading with the country) can be added as a time-varying instrument to 
the first-stage regression.  This argument implies also adding country risk for the two 
trade partners to the second stage regression.
15 
We obtain our measure of country risk from the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG), which seeks to assess political, economic and financial risk.  Here we focus on 
its measure of political risk, which seeks to capture bureaucracy quality, corruption, 
democratic accountability, ethnic tensions, external conflict, government stability, 
internal conflict, investment profile, law and order, military in politics, religious tensions, 
and socioeconomic conditions.  The political risk index runs from 0 to 100, with higher 
values implying lower risk.
16   
Table 3a shows what happens when we add this variable to the first and second 
stages.  The country risk variables enter as expected.  In addition, our previous findings 
are little changed.  Most importantly, the coefficient on China’s exports, at -0.16, is very 
similar to before.  The one instance where the results are noticeably affected is when we 
use the limited set of instruments, dropping China’s GDP.  There, the coefficient on 
                                                 
15 This has the further advantage of adding variables that are close substitutes for country fixed effects. 
16  Between 1990 to 2002, the period covered here, the index for China varies from 56 to 75.   For 
additional details on the index, see http://www.prsgroup.com/commonhtml/ methods.html#_ 
International_Country_Risk.   14 
Chinese exports goes to –0.05.  China’s country risk has been declining, while its GNP 
has been rising.  The correlation of the two variables thus accounts for the change in 
results.
17  
We now ask whether these results are affected by disaggregating trade.  Initially, 
we disaggregate along two dimensions.  We distinguish industrial- and developing-
country importers.  And we distinguish different Asian exporters. 
Previously we assumed that China’s exports crowd out the exports of each Asian 
exporter in each third-country market to the same extent.  In columns 1 through 4 of 
Table 4 we relax this assumption, estimating the same equation separately for industrial- 
and developing-country importers.
18  The results do not suggest significant differences in 
the extent of crowding out of Asian countries’ exports to the two sets of markets.  
In columns 5-6 we allow for different effects of Chinese competition on different 
Asian exporters. The effects now range from –0.46 for Bangladesh to –0.16 for Malaysia.  
While it is possible to tell stories about these patterns (for example, that the most 
crowding out is suffered by countries like Bangladesh that are most dependent on exports 
of textiles and other consumer goods in which Chinese competition is particularly 
intense), we would not attach too much weight to them, since the equations including the 
entire vector of interaction terms suffer from multicolinearity.
19  Here is one place where 
different specifications yield rather different coefficient estimates, which is a caution 
against overinterpreting these results. 
                                                 
17 When including country risk in the regressions that follow, we therefore utilize the full instrument set so 
as not to attribute to this variable the effects of rising Chinese incomes. 
18 Here and in what follows, we continue to include the country-risk measure added in the previous section 
on the grounds that estimates with time-varying instruments are more reliable. 
19 The standard test for multicolinearity, the variance inflation factor (VIF) test, exhibits a statistic close to 
30, which is evidence of multicolinearity.  While it is unusual to find multicolinearity when many of the 
coefficients in question are seemingly so precisely estimated (when they have t statistics well above 2), 
these large t statistics reflect our large sample.   15 
Finally, in columns 7-8 we allow for different elasticities for imports by industrial 
and developing countries and for different Asian exporters to both types of markets.
20  
Again, we observe considerable variation in the extent of crowding out across exporting 
countries and import markets.  Again, however, it is hard to know how much weight to 
place on these results – or how to interpret them – given the extent of multicolinearity.
21 
 
7.  Distinguishing Capital Goods, Intermediates, and Consumer Goods 
Much of our intuition derives from the idea that China’s growth has different 
implications for exporters of capital goods, intermediate goods, and consumer goods.  If 
this is what is driving our results, then we should examine this issue directly.  
Unfortunately, IMF data do not disaggregate trade in this way.  In this section we 
therefore utilize the United Nations’ disaggregated trade data base, which allows us to do 
so.  The cost is somewhat less complete geographical coverage.  We therefore first 
replicated our previous analysis using the UN data.  Reassuringly, the results are little 
changed.  For example, in the benchmark estimates of Table 1, the coefficient on China’s 
exports in the second stage falls only from -0.18 to -0.17 when the full instrument set is 
used and from -0.23 to -0.16 when we use the limited set of instruments.
22  The UN data 
mainly miss out a number of small island countries and poor African economies.  
Evidently, their trade is not sufficiently important to noticeably modify our results when 
it is dropped.   
                                                 
20 Now in order to obtain the total effect one must add the coefficient on the interaction of imports from 
China (“fitimchina”) with the individual Asian country dummy (for cases where the import market is a 
developing country) to the three-way interaction of fiited imports from China, the Asian exporter dummy, 
and an industrial country dummy (for cases where the import market is an industrial country). 
21 Despite the respectable t statistics on a number of the interaction terms, the VIF test again produces a 
statistic close to 30. 
22 As usual, the standard gravity-model variables continue to perform nicely.  The estimates in Table 4 are 
similarly little changed.   16 
        We divided commodity exports into capital goods, consumer goods, and 
intermediates (and other products) in the following way.  The UN data are classified on 
the basis of the second revision of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC).  
Capital goods include machinery and transport equipment (a subset of SITC 7).  
Consumption goods include food (SITC 0), beverages and tobacco (SITC 1), 
miscellaneous manufactured articles (SITC 8), television and radio receivers (7.6.1, 7.6.2, 
and 7.6.3), passenger motor vehicles and cycles (7.8.1 and 7.8.5), and medicinal and 
pharmaceutical products (5.4). All the remaining goods (SITC 2,3,4,5,6 and 9) are 
classified as intermediates.   
Here we focus on the results for all importers and exporters combined (in order to 
avoid the multicolinearity problem identified above).  Table 5 thus reports three 
equations, one for exports of capital goods, one for exports of intermediate goods, and 
one for exports of consumer goods.  As before, we now include the distance from China 
to the third country export market, China’s GDP, and China’s country risk in the first 
stage regression.   
The results are quite interesting.  The coefficients for China’s exports are small 
and statistically indistinguishable from zero in the equations for capital goods and 
intermediates.  (The respective t statistics are 0.8 and 0.4.)  In contrast, there is a large 
negative coefficient (-0.28) in the equation for consumer goods with a t statistic of 8.1.  
From an econometric point of view, this is consistent with our earlier results for total 
trade; our earlier coefficient of -0.17 is effectively a weighted average of the large 
negative coefficient for consumer goods exports and the small coefficients for the other 
two categories of exports.    17 
 
8.  China’s Imports 
The last set of regressions needed to construct the counterfactual is for the impact 
of Chinese growth on Chinese imports.  Once more we base our estimates on the gravity 
model framework (where the volume of Chinese imports depends on GDP and GDP per 
capita in China and the exporting country).  One problem with applying the gravity 
model in this context is that the distance variable – calculated here as the distance 
between country geographic centers – enters insignificantly or with the wrong (positive) 
sign.  A little reflection reveals why: distance from other Asian countries to China’s 
geographic center is not a meaningful measure of economic distance, given that much of 
the country’s trade-relevant economic activity is concentrated not at its center but along 
the coast.  Bangladesh is 11 per cent closer than Vietnam to China’s center, but Vietnam 
is much closer to the Pearl River Delta, where much of China’s export-relevant economic 
activity takes place.  Differences in the distance between China’s geographic center and, 
say, Bangkok versus Copenhagen do in fact tell us something about the relative 
(transportation and information) costs of exporting from China to Thailand versus 
Denmark.  This is why distance is a powerful instrument in the first-stage regressions 
using the global sample, as reported above.  But in the context of China’s imports from 
its Asian neighbors, the distance between geographic centers works less well.  Hence, in 
the equations for China’s imports from other Asian economies, we drop the distance 
variable.   
The results are in Table 6.  The elasticity of Chinese imports with respect to 
Chinese GDP is on the order of one when the equation is estimated over the entire period   18 
1990-2002; this is more or less true for every Asian exporter.  But when the sample is 
limited to the second half of the period (1997-2002), we see considerably larger Chinese 
import elasticities of demand, in particular for high-income Asian exporters of capital 
goods and components (Japan, Korea), for Asian exporters of energy and raw materials 
(such as Indonesia) and, interestingly, for India.  In contrast, this elasticity is lowest for 
low-income, relatively resource-poor Asian countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and 
Cambodia.   
Table 7 reports separate equations for Chinese imports of capital goods, 
intermediate goods and consumer goods.  The income elasticities of demand for capital 
goods, intermediates and consumer goods are all positive, as expected.  But the income 
elasticity for capital goods is especially large, in excess of two.  This is consistent with 
the oft-heard observation that China’s growth is good for suppliers of machinery and 
equipment. 
 
9.  Counterfactuals 
  We now use the preceding estimates to ask how each country’s exports (to China, 
to third countries, and as a whole) are affected by a ten per cent increase in Chinese 
income.  Note that this avoids the “fallacy of composition” problem in previous studies 
where the comparative-statics experiment is an increase in Chinese exports.  These 
studies have been criticized (e.g. by Mayer 2003) for ignoring the fact that an increase in 
Chinese exports presumably reflects and results in an increase in Chinese incomes that 
also stimulates Chinese imports.  Asking how an increase in China’s exports will affect 
the global export market shares of other countries without recognizing that the underlying   19 
increase in Chinese incomes will also translate into an increase in that country’s demands 
for imports from its trading partners neglects an important part of the question.   
Our estimates are not subject to this problem, since the counterfactual here is an 
increase in Chinese GDP.  We use our gravity model estimates to derive the implications 
of that GDP growth for China’s exports and the impact they have in turn on the exports 
of its Asian neighbors to markets other than China.  The first stage regressions tell us that 
a 10 per cent increase in Chinese GDP is associated with an 11.7 per cent increase in 
China’s own exports; according to the disaggregated trade data, this breaks down into a 
23.2 per cent increase in its exports of capital goods, an 11.5 per cent increase in its 
exports of consumer goods, and a 10.9 per cent increase in its exports of intermediates.  
We then combine those results with our estimates of how China’s export growth affects 
the third-market exports of its neighbors and how its income growth affects it imports 
from other Asian countries.
23 
We use the parameters estimated over the full period 1990-2002 with the trade 
data disaggregated into capital goods, intermediate goods, and consumer goods.
24  For 
China’s own import demands, we use the different income elasticities for different 
exporting countries in Table 7.  For other countries’ import demands, we use the 
estimates based on the assumption that these parameters are the same for all exporters 
and importers, excepting of course China itself (as in Table 5).
25   
                                                 
23 To be sure, this is not the end of the story.  Presumably there will be induced changes in foreign GDPs, 
which will further affect these countries’ imports and exports.  The repercussions of these induced changes 
in output and trade will then presumably affect the development of China’s output and trade.  But these 
second-round effects will be small relative to the first-order effects that we add to previous analyses. 
24 Substituting the parameters for the shorter (post-1996) period only reinforces our results (see below). 
25 Given the multicolinearity problem described above, we regard these constrained estimates as more 
reliable.   20 
Table 8 shows the results.  We report the percentage change in exports of capital 
goods, intermediates and consumer goods in the first three columns and the sum of the 
three effects – weighted by the country-specific share of each type of exports – for each 
Asian country.  The numbers in each column are the sum of the direct effect of Chinese 
growth on China’s demand for imports and the indirect effect, if any, in crowding out 
exports in third markets.  For example, a 10 per cent increase in Chinese income leads to 
a 0.3 per cent increase in Japanese exports.  Since the crowding out coefficients in the 
equations for capital goods and intermediates are small and insignificant, we set them to 
zero in these simulations.
26 
 Table 8 shows a range of effects, both in terms of the sign of the change in 
exports and its magnitude.
27  But there is a pattern to those effects.  China’s growth has a 
positive effect on the exports of high income Asian countries such as Japan, Singapore 
and South Korea that are significant exporters of capital goods, little discernible effect on 
the exports of middle income countries such as Malaysia and the Philippines that export a 
range of products, and a strong negative effect on the exports of low-income Asian 
countries such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Vietnam that are heavily 
dependent on the production and sale of consumer goods. This reflects the greater 
tendency for Chinese exports to compete with other countries’ exports of consumer 
                                                 
26  Using the actual values of these insignificant coefficients (rather than setting them to zero) only 
strengthens the key result of this section, that the exports of high-income countries specialized in the 
production of capital goods rise with Chinese GDP, while the exports of low-income countries specialized 
in the production of consumer goods fall with Chinese incomes.  This is because the sign of the 
insignificant coefficient in the equation for capital goods is positive.  
27 When we add the vector of interaction terms for individual Asian exporters to the trade equations, we get 
negative effects of Chinese income growth on the neighbors, across the board.  The reason why will be 
evident from Table 4, where one sees that every element of the vector tends to enter with a negative sign.  
These negative effects of Chinese export growth in third markets then dominate the direct effect on Chinese 
import demand.  However, the coefficient estimates in question suffer from multicolinearity, as explained 
above.  Hence we are not inclined to place too much weight on those results.   21 
goods, together with the country’s unusually high income elasticity of demand for 
capital-goods imports – and the different product mixes of different countries. 
A number of additional country-specific results are worth flagging.  First, of all 
the Asian countries considered, South Korea enjoys the largest percentage increase in 
exports, mainly reflecting the stimulus felt by its capital-goods producers.
28  Second, 
Indonesia experiences only a small negative overall effect despite a significant fall in 
consumer-goods exports, reflecting its dependence on commodity exports, including 
energy.
29  Third, the net impact on India is smaller than that on Bangladesh, Pakistan, and 
Sri Lanka, reflecting its more diversified product mix.  All of these results are consistent 
with common sense and conventional wisdom. 
  
10.  Conclusions and Implications 
In this paper we have analyzed the impact of China’s growth on the exports of its 
Asian neighbors.  Our innovation has been to distinguish the increase in China’s own 
demand for imports from the effects of its increased penetration of export markets, and 
the tendency for the latter to crowd out the exports of its Asian neighbors.  Use of the 
gravity model has enabled us to disaggregate among commodity types and to adjust for 
the endogeneity of Chinese exports.   
                                                 
28 40 per cent of Korea’s exports are capital goods, a lower share than Japan’s 52 per cent and Singapore’s 
60 per cent.  However, 10 per cent of Korea’s capital goods exports go to China, which is the highest 
among all Asian exporting countries. Similarly, while a third of Korea’s exports are consumer goods, 
putting it roughly in the middle among Asian countries, nearly a tenth of those consumer goods exports go 
to China, which is the highest share among Asian countries. Thus, both factors help to account why 
Korea’s exports suffer least from Chinese income growth. 
29 Energy is included with intermediates in our calculations.  Thus, for Indonesia the positive response of 
exports of intermediates to China essentially offset the negative effect on Indonesian exports of consumer 
goods to third markets.   22 
We find different effects for exporters of capital goods and consumer goods and 
hence for Asia’s more and less developed countries.  There is a tendency for China’s 
exports to third markets to crowd out the exports of other Asian countries.  But this effect 
is felt mainly in markets for consumer goods and hence by less-developed Asian 
countries that export those products, not in markets for capital goods or by the more 
advanced Asian economies for which machinery and equipment comprise a significant 
fraction of total exports.  This makes sense, in that it has been markets for generic 
consumer goods and not those for technologically sophisticated machinery and 
equipment that have been first to be penetrated by Chinese exporters.  At the same time, 
there has been a strong tendency for a rapidly growing China to suck up imports from its 
Asian neighbors, offsetting the third-market effect to a greater or lesser extent.  But this 
direct effect of Chinese imports is mainly felt in markets for capital goods, where China’s 
income elasticity of import demand is highest, and thus by the more advanced Asian 
economies.  Hence, more and less developed Asian countries are being affected very 
differently by China’s rise.  Our benchmark results suggest that an increase in Chinese 
output, and thus in both China’s appetite for imports and capacity to export, positively 
affects the exports of its high-income neighbors but negative affects the exports of less-
developed countries in the region. 
These results are not reassuring for those concerned with the plight of Asia’s 
poorer countries.  Of course, trade is only one channel through which China is affecting 
its Asian neighbors.  An example of another channel is foreign direct investment (FDI).  
The issues that arise in this context are analogous to those analyzed here.  On the one 
hand there is FDI diversion, or the tendency for China as an FDI magnet to appropriate   23 
foreign investment previously destined for other Asian countries.  On the other hand there 
are the benefits of Asian countries’ own foreign direct investment in China, which 
presumably means a higher marginal rate of return on investment than would be available 
otherwise to domestic firms and households.  As in our analysis, the overall impact 
depends on the relative magnitude the two effects, which is uncertain in theory and can 
only be determined empirically.  But some previous discussions of FDI diversion suggest, 
analogously to our results for trade, that Asia’s less developed countries that seek to 
compete with China on the basis of labor costs are particularly exposed to the danger of 
FDI diversion.  
The past is also an imperfect guide to the future.  Our results suggest that China’s 
elasticity of demand for imports from its Asian neighbors has been shifting up over time.  
If this trend continues, it could be that the direct positive impact of China’s demand for 
imports will soon dominate the third-market crowding-out effects of its exports for a 
growing number of Asian countries.  The fact that China’s trade balance has recently 
swung from surplus to deficit, evidently as a corollary of its continuing economic growth, 
is consistent with this more sanguine view.  Be that as it may, we will have to wait for 
more data before we know whether this outcome in fact obtains.   24 
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0.70  0.78 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 



































Table 1b: First Stage Estimation: Determinants of China’s  






















































































China’s GDP (log) 
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Number of observations  18354  18354 
R-square  0.82  0.80 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.   27 
 
Table 2: Impact of China’s Exports on Asian Countries’ Exports to 
Third Markets, Recent Period (1997-2002) 
  Coefficient  Standard error 
China's exports (log)  -0.33  0.05 
GDP of importing country (log)  1.17  0.05 
GDP per capita of importing country (log)  0.15  0.02 
GDP of exporting country (log)  0.76  0.02 
GDP per capita of exporting country (log)  0.33  0.02 
Product of land areas (log)  -0.04  0.01 
Distance (log)  -1.29  0.04 
Common language dummy  0.51  0.05 
Number of land locked (0/1/2)  -1.09  0.05 
Number of islands (0/1/2)  -0.50  0.03 
Land border dummy  0.34  0.17 
Common colonizer post 1945  0.95  0.06 
Dummy for pairs ever in colonial relationship  0.93  0.19 
Constant  -35.39  0.86 
Number of Observations  9444   
R-squared  0.72   
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Table 3a: The Impact of China’s Exports on Asian Countries’ Exports to 
Third Markets (1990-2002), with the Addition of Time-Varying Instruments 
  Full IV  Full IV  Limited IV  Limited IV 
  coef.  st. err.  coef.  st. err. 
China's exports (log)  -0.157  0.026  -0.054  0.040 
GDP of importing country (log)  0.970  0.026  0.876  0.038 
GDP per capita of importing country (log)  0.133  0.015  0.141  0.015 
GDP of exporting country (log)  0.662  0.014  0.652  0.013 
GDP per capita of exporting country (log)  0.408  0.017  0.421  0.017 
Product of land areas (log)  0.000  0.007  0.007  0.007 
Distance (log)  -1.484  0.034  -1.385  0.044 
Common language dummy  0.490  0.033  0.463  0.033 
Number of land locked (0/1/2)  -0.749  0.037  -0.711  0.038 
Number of islands (0/1/2)  -0.481  0.024  -0.472  0.023 
Land border dummy  -0.544  0.132  -0.431  0.132 
Common colonizer post 1945  0.870  0.044  0.849  0.043 
Dummy for pairs ever in colonial relationship  1.088  0.124  1.097  0.120 
Political Risk for importing country  0.010  0.001  0.008  0.002 
Political Risk for exporting country  0.008  0.001  0.006  0.001 
Constant  -29.7  0.5  -28.6  0.6 
Number of Obs  14399    14399   
R^2  0.77    0.78   
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Table 3b: First Stage Estimation: Determinants of China’s Exports to Third Markets 
  Full IV  Full IV  Limited IV  Limited IV 
  coef.  st. err.  coef.  st. err. 
GDP of importing country (log)  0.857  0.008  0.877  0.008 
GDP per capita of importing country (log)  0.041  0.012  -0.069  0.012 
GDP of exporting country (log)  0.043  0.010  0.087  0.010 
GDP per capita of exporting country (log)  -0.027  0.013  -0.135  0.013 
Product of land areas (log)  -0.029  0.005  -0.044  0.006 
Distance (log)  -0.151  0.031  -0.145  0.032 
Common language dummy  0.345  0.024  0.276  0.026 
Number of land locked (0/1/2)  -0.404  0.027  -0.420  0.028 
Number of islands (0/1/2)  -0.066  0.018  -0.081  0.019 
Land border dummy  -0.543  0.097  -0.561  0.103 
Common colonizer post 1945  0.308  0.032  0.322  0.034 
Dummy for pairs ever in colonial relation  -0.020  0.092  -0.078  0.097 
Political Risk for importing country  0.008  0.001  0.023  0.001 
Political Risk for exporting country  -0.002  0.001  0.011  0.001 
Distance from China to third market (log)  -1.001  0.031  -0.993  0.033 
China’s GDP (log)  1.187  0.030     
China's Risk  -0.001  0.002  0.008  0.002 
Cons  -39.8  0.8  -9.2  0.3 
Number of Obs  14399    14399   
R^2  0.82    0.8   
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Table 4: The Impact of China’s Exports on Asian Countries’ Exports to Third Markets, 






















China's exports (log)  -0.204  0.058  -0.137  0.028           
GDP of importing country (log)  1.234  0.063  0.876  0.028  1.156  0.025  1.141  0.025 
GDP per capita of importing 
country (log) 
-0.080  0.053  0.160  0.019  0.057  0.015  0.027  0.015 
GDP of exporting country (log)  0.463  0.017  0.732  0.017  0.925  0.023  0.886  0.024 
GDP per capita of exporting 
country (log) 
0.388  0.021  0.405  0.021  0.205  0.025  0.139  0.026 
Product of land areas (log)  0.090  0.009  -0.031  0.010  -0.064  0.008  -0.073  0.008 
Distance (log)  -0.356  0.048  -1.630  0.040  -1.648  0.033  -1.676  0.032 
Common language dummy  0.519  0.042  0.346  0.041  0.615  0.034  0.593  0.033 
Number of land locked (0/1/2)  -0.535  0.059  -0.756  0.044  -0.766  0.034  -0.779  0.033 
Number of islands (0/1/2)  -0.093  0.030  -0.641  0.031  -0.360  0.031  -0.305  0.031 
Land border dummy      -0.631  0.140  -0.827  0.121  -0.817  0.119 
Common colonizer post 1945      0.847  0.047  0.722  0.042  0.683  0.043 
Dummy for pairs ever in colonial 
relation 
0.692  0.086  0.284  0.290  0.963  0.113  0.934  0.112 
Political Risk for importing country  0.018  0.003  0.009  0.002  0.014  0.001  0.012  0.001 
Political Risk for exporting country  0.013  0.002  0.006  0.002  0.006  0.001  0.009  0.001 
Fitimchina*Japan          -0.427  0.029  -0.360  0.030 
Fitimchina*Bangladesh          -0.458  0.026  -0.575  0.027 
Fitimchina*Sri Lanka          -0.235  0.025  -0.284  0.026 
Fitimchina*India          -0.340  0.028  -0.316  0.029 
Fitimchina*Indonesia          -0.162  0.025  -0.115  0.025 
Fitimchina*Korea          -0.330  0.027  -0.231  0.028 
Fitimchina*Malaysia          -0.155  0.026  -0.139  0.026 
Fitimchina*Pakistan          -0.381  0.026  -0.398  0.026 
Fitimchina*Philippines          -0.348  0.025  -0.431  0.026 
Fitimchina*Singapore          -0.237  0.028  -0.214  0.029 
Fitimchina*Thailand          -0.268  0.026  -0.263  0.027 
Fitimchina*Vietnam          -0.235  0.027  -0.276  0.028 
Fitimchina*Japan*Industrial              -0.004  0.015 
Fitimchina*Bangladesh*Industrial              0.245  0.015 
Fitimchina*Sri Lanka*Industrial              0.088  0.015 
Fitimchina*India*Industrial              -0.021  0.015 
Fitimchina*Indonesia*Industrial              -0.055  0.015 
Fitimchina*Korea*Industrial              -0.132  0.014 
Fitimchina*Malaysia*Industrial              0.016  0.015 
Fitimchina*Pakistan*Industrial              0.057  0.014 
Fitimchina*Philippines*Industrial              0.196  0.015 
Fitimchina*Singapore*Industrial              -0.005  0.015 
Fitimchina*Thailand*Industrial              0.042  0.014 
Fitimchina*Vietnam*Industrial              0.061  0.015 
Constant  -42.0  1.7  -27.2  0.5  -35.3  0.6  -32.9  0.7 
Number of observations  3375    11024    14399    14399   
R-square  0.88    0.74    0.81    0.82     31 
 















  Coef.  St. err.  Coef.  St. err.  Coef.  St. err. 
China's exports (log)  0.02  0.03  -0.284  0.035  -0.014  0.038 
GDP of importing country (log)  0.86  0.03  1.027  0.033  1.058  0.042 
GDP per capita of importing country (log)  0.13  0.03  0.279  0.020  -0.092  0.024 
GDP of exporting country (log)  0.84  0.02  0.693  0.017  0.774  0.018 
GDP per capita of exporting country (log)  0.88  0.03  0.202  0.021  0.434  0.023 
Product of land areas (log)  0.03  0.01  0.018  0.009  0.010  0.010 
Distance (log)  -1.25  0.05  -1.448  0.043  -1.496  0.050 
Common language dummy  0.72  0.05  0.466  0.042  0.317  0.045 
Number of land locked (0/1/2)  -0.30  0.06  -0.436  0.045  -0.682  0.051 
Number of islands (0/1/2)  -0.20  0.04  -0.443  0.029  -0.427  0.031 
Land border dummy  0.10  0.20  -1.199  0.166  -0.324  0.174 
Common colonizer post 1945  0.99  0.07  0.785  0.057  1.272  0.062 
Dummy for pairs ever in colonial relationship  1.515  0.18  1.271  0.142  0.999  0.152 
Political Risk for importing country  0.010  0.002  0.018  0.002  0.003  0.002 
Political Risk for exporting country  0.029  0.002  0.008  0.002  0.002  0.002 
Constant  -29.557  0.636  -15.557  0.482  -21.042  0.522 
Number of Obs.  10702    12040    11783   
R^2  0.730    0.7    0.73   
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Table 6: China’s Imports from Asian Countries,  
Disaggregated by Exporting Country 
  1990-2002  1990-2002  1997-2002  1997-2002 
  Coefficient  St. Error  Coefficient  St. Error 
Log of China’s GDP*Japan  0.95  0.40  2.28  0.81 
Log of China’s GDP*Korea  1.05  0.35  2.18  0.71 
Log of China’s GDP*Singapore  0.97  0.32  2.03  0.56 
Log of China’s GDP*Indonesia  1.22  0.35  2.14  0.81 
Log of China’s GDP*Malaysia  1.11  0.31  2.07  0.64 
Log of China’s GDP*Philippines  1.16  0.32  2.05  0.72 
Log of China’s GDP*Thailand  1.12  0.33  2.10  0.71 
Log of China’s GDP*Bangladesh  1.16  0.32  1.92  0.76 
Log of China’s GDP*Cambodia  1.16  0.26  1.82  0.56 
Log of China’s GDP*Sri Lanka  1.05  0.28  1.80  0.60 
Log of China’s GDP* Pakistan  1.21  0.33  2.03  0.76 
Log of China’s GDP* Vietnam  1.25  0.31  2.01  0.71 
Log of China’s GDP*India  1.23  0.40  2.16  0.95 
Log of GDP of exporting country  0.34  1.26  -1.34  2.84 
Log of GDP per capita of exporting country  2.29  1.52  0.76  3.04 
Constant  -50.56  18.25  -21.90  35.80 
Number of Observations  166    78   
R-squared  0.95    0.98   
         
   33 
 
Table 7: China’s Imports from Asian Countries, 









Japan  2.16  1.35  0.40 
Bangladesh  1.61  1.39  0.92 
Sri lanka  2.12  1.40  0.51 
India  1.44  1.43  1.24 
Indonesia  1.83  1.44  0.98 
Korea  2.27  1.44  0.48 
Malaysia  2.34  1.44  0.50 
Pakistan  1.72  1.50  0.91 
Philippine  2.02  1.43  0.77 
Singapore  2.74  1.41  0.05 
Thailand  2.12  1.46  0.67 
Vietnam  1.88  1.50  0.96 
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Japan  0.18  -0.24  0.05  0.03 
Bangladesh  0.00  -0.32  0.05  -0.28 
Cambodia  0.01  -0.32  0.09  -0.24 
Sri lanka  0.03  -0.32  0.00  -0.25 
India  0.02  -0.30  0.06  -0.12 
Indonesia  0.14  -0.30  0.08  -0.04 
Korea  0.23  -0.19  0.12  0.06 
Malaysia  0.11  -0.30  0.04  -0.01 
Pakistan  0.06  -0.25  0.07  -0.21 
Philippine  0.11  -0.30  0.05  -0.01 
Singapore  0.11  -0.28  0.00  0.03 
Thailand  0.11  -0.29  0.08  -0.07 
Vietnam  0.04  -0.30  0.14  -0.14 
 
 
 